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ARGUMENT 
Appellees' Brief raises five main issues, all of which 
are questions of law: (1) whether the Foil legal injury test 
requires only awareness of temporary symptoms; (2) whether the Foil 
legal injury test requires knowledge of the likely or probable 
cause of the injury; (3) whether the Foil test requires that a 
plaintiff know the possibility of negligence; (4) whether the 
continuing treatment doctrine adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932) was abrogated by §78-
14-4; and (5) whether the unique facts of this case require this 
Court to recognize the continuing treatment doctrine as an 
exception to §78-14-4. Issues 1, 2, and 4 and 5 have not been 
previously addressed by this Court or the Supreme Court. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
THE FOIL LEGAL INJURY TEST. 
In Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) the 
Utah Supreme Court reasoned that the term "injury" in §78-14-4 
means "legal injury". The statutory period does not begin to run 
until discovery of "facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that he may have a cause of action against the health care 
provider." Haraett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah 
1984). Knowledge of a cause of action, requires knowledge of "[1] 
the existence of an injury, [2] its cause, and [3] the possibility 
of negligence." Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155. The following will 
show the Trial Court improperly applied the Foil test, basing its 
decision entirely on the first prong, only incompletely on the 
second prong and failed to address the third prong at all. 
1 
1. The Foil Legal Injury Test Is Not Satisfied 
By Mere Awareness Of A Temporary Injury. 
Appellees suggest that the Trial Court properly found 
that knowledge of a temporary injury alone "is sufficient to start 
the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions." Brief 
of Appellees, p. 39. Contrary to Appellees' claims, cases 
subsequent to Foil have never held that the legal injury test is 
satisfied by showing only a plaintiff's knowledge of temporary 
symptoms or dysfunctions. The cases have consistently recognized 
Foil's requirement that the action accrues only after knowledge of 
injury, whether temporary or permanent, "resulting from 
negligence". Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp. 781, 
785 (D. Utah 1987)(although plaintiff believed the injury to be 
temporary, she knew the injury "resulted from negligent 
treatment")(emphasis added); Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates/ 
773 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff knew "that he had 
sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent 
action.")(emphasis added); Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 
(Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff "knew or should have known more than 
two years before she filed this action that her mother's death was 
the result of the health care providers' negligence")(emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, as a matter of law, knowledge of legal injury, 
and not mere knowledge of physical injury, must still be 
established to trigger the statute of limitations under the case 
law subsequent to Foil. Foil, 601 P. 2d at 148. Insofar as the 
2 
Trial Court based its decision solely on evidence that Jones was 
aware of a physical injury more than two years before the filing of 
his complaint, it erred and reversal is warranted. 
Other courts have recognized the soundness of Foil's 
requirement that a plaintiff be aware of the full nature and extent 
of injury before the statute can accrue. See Foil, 601 P.2d at 
147; Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir. 1980); 
Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 251 (Nev. 1983); Burns v. Hartford 
Hospital, 472 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Conn. 1984); Cleveland v. Wong, 701 
P.2d 1301, 1306 (Kan. 1985) (statute of limitations did not run 
even though the plaintiff knew that he was both incontinent and 
impotent immediately after surgery but was advised by his 
physicians that these conditions were temporary)- If> in fact, 
subsequent courts have deviated from Foil, as Appellees argue, by 
permitting the statute to accrue with mere knowledge of a physical 
injury, reversal of the trend to erode Foil is warranted. 
2. The Foil Legal Injury Test Requires That A Plaintiff Know The 
True Cause Or The Likely Cause Of The Injury. 
The Trial Court found that the statute in this case began 
to run when Jones knew that the second surgery was "a" possible 
cause of his injuries. Pleadings (hereinafter "PL."), at 1085 
(Findings of Fact 516); PL. at 1087 (Conclusions of Law 53); PL. at 
1048 (Court's Decision). However, the second prong of the Foil 
legal injury test has been interpreted to require existence of an 
injury and knowledge of ,fits cause". Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155. 
See also Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1985). To 
3 
have knowledge of "its" cause, a plaintiff must have knowledge of 
the true cause of the injury; this refers to the act of the 
defendant which gave rise to the injury. Christiansen v. Rees, 436 
P. 2d 435, 436 (Utah 1969); Foil, 601 P. 2d at 147. Applying the 
similar inquiry of knowledge of causation under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), Judge Richard Posner has stated: "When there 
are two causes of an injury/ and only one is the government, the 
knowledge that is required to set the statute of limitations 
running is knowledge of the government cause, not just the other 
cause." Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1985); 
See also Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 
1985). The United States Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff be 
"in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who 
has inflicted the injury" for a claim to accrue under the FTCA. 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 122 (1979) (emphasis 
added). See also Imes v. Tourma, 784 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 
1986); Williams, 637 F.2d at 735. 
In cases of multiple possible causes, it has been 
recognized that knowledge of causation requires that a plaintiff 
know the "likely or probable" cause of the injury/ not just a 
possible cause. Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 779, 805 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 
1183 (Utah 1989)(plaintiff knew that her injuries "were most likely 
caused" by oxygen deprivation); Maughan v. S. W. Servicing, Inc., 
758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985) (in cases involving multiple 
causes, the statute must be tolled until the plaintiff knows or 
4 
should know that one particular source was likely the cause of the 
injury); Mendez by Martinez v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 701, 706 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff's knowledge that the medical cause of 
newborn's injury was "possibly lack of oxygen to the brain" did not 
cause claim to accrue); Lee v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 883, 886 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hance v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
The only finding by the Trial Court on this issue was 
that Jones knew that the surgery had not been ruled out as a 
possible cause of the injury. PL. 1048-49. However, there is no 
evidence that Jones' knew that surgery was "the (cause) or (the) 
likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions. TR. at 1235 lines 4-15 
(testimony of Dr. BeckerJ.1 
1
 Dr. Becker had not been able to diagnose the cause or the 
likely cause of Jones' sexual disabilities. TR. 1189 lines 9-25, 
at 1190 lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker). In response to what 
the cause of Jones' sexual dysfunction is Dr. Becker replied: "I'm 
not sure. Based on all the tests and what has happened and so 
forth, and the number of people who have seen him and consulted on 
the problem, I think it's still very unclear." TR. at 1235 lines 
23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3. Dr. Becker's letter of May 29, 1984, to 
Dr. Richard Middleton, stated: "I explained [to Jones] that no 
true case of impotence had been reported with the mucosal 
proctectomy and ileoanal pull-through procedure. In fact, the 
operation is performed anatomically such that it is almost 
impossible to damage the parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to 
totally destroy the sympathetic innervation." Plaintiff's exhibit 
no. 4. Dr. Becker told Jones that the cause of his sexual 
dysfunctions was "unlikely related" to the surgery. TR. at 1196 
lines 19-25, at 1197 lines 1-2, at 1234 lines 7-12 (testimony of 
Dr. Becker). Jones was also informed by University Hospital and 
other physicians that it was "highly unlikely" that surgery was the 
cause of his sexual dysfunctions. TR. at 1653 lines 1-25, at 1654 
lines 1-17, at 1657 lines 1-2, at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony of 
Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1373 lines 11-21, at 1383 lines 5-15 
(testimony of Dr. Mangelson). The District Court also found that 
Jones' sexual dysfunctions were "unlikely to be the result of 
surgery." PL. at 1050-51 (Court's Decision). 
5 
Jones was referred to numerous other doctors about his 
condition based on numerous other possible causes of his 
dysfunction. Finally, in September of 1987, Dr. Dayton told Jones 
that the "most likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions was that 
"something went wrong during the surgeries". TR. at 1449 lines 18-
25, at 1450 lines 12-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). This is the 
only evidence offered which indicates that anyone told Jones that 
the surgery was the likely or probable cause of his injuries. 
Finding knowledge of causation because Jones made a connection 
between the surgery and his injury improperly bases knowledge on 
mere layman's speculation. Foil explained, "common experience 
teaches that one often suffers pain and other physical difficulties 
without suspecting the true cause, and may, as often happens, 
ascribe a totally erroneous cause to the manifestations. Foil, 601 
P.2d at 144; See Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350, 1353 
(11th Cir. 1988); Reis v. Cox, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982). 
Therefore, Jones actually had no facts upon which to base a 
knowledge that the surgery was the likely cause of his injuries. 
Appellees argue that Jones knew the cause of his injuries 
because he allegedly threatened to sue the University Hospital. 
Appellees Brief at p. 29-30, Findings of Fact 520, Transcript 
(hereinafter "TR.") at 1086. This assertion is contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence. Jones not only strongly denied this 
assertion, TR. at 1319 lines 3-5, at 1320 lines 5-7, but 
explained that any threats, if they existed, were directed toward 
the impersonal way he was treated as an individual at the Hospital. 
6 
TR. at 1314a lines 21-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Dr. Harmon 
also testified Jones was angry because the Appellees failed to 
return his phone calls and failed to respond to his questions. TR. 
at 1634 lines 11-21, at 1642 lines 8-15 (testimony of Dr. Harmon). 
Even Terri Stoker, the person upon whose testimony Appellees rely 
for this assertion, testified that Jones' litigation threats were 
related to "his dissatisfaction with how he's being treated by the 
secretary/receptionist and others." TR. at 1581 lines 4-8. When 
the Stoker testimony is read in context, it is clear that Jones' 
complaints were directed to the bedside manner of the University 
and the red tape he confronted.2 See TR. at pages 1579-1584 
(testimony of Terri Stoker). A patient's complaints about a 
doctor's bedside manner is insufficient to start the statute of 
limitations in a claim of malpractice. Rispoli v. United States, 
576 F. Supp. 1401, 1402 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
Finally it is axiomatic that a patient cannot be expected 
to discover the medical cause of his injuries "before the doctors 
themselves are able to do so." Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 
799, 805 (9th Cir. 1987); Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350, 
1353 (11th Cir. 1988). Further complicating matters, in this case, 
the Trial Court found, as a matter of fact, that Jones had suffered 
no injury as a result of the surgeries. In its decision the Trial 
Court wrote: "[I]n the instant case there still appears to be a 
^The Memo to which Appellees refer is an unsigned, undated 
memo that was not included in Appellees' production of documents in 
response to Jones' Motion to Compel hospital files. The memo 
appeared shortly before trial. TR. at 1556, lines 23-25. 
7 
real fact question about the nature and existence of any sexual 
dysfunction and the cause." PL. at 1048 (Court's Decision) 
(emphasis added); See also PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 515); PL. 
at 1084 (Findings of Fact 511); PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 517), 
at 1086 (Findings of Fact 5518, 19, 20 and 26); See also PL. at 
1048 (Court's Decision). 
The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations when 
a plaintiff, despite the exercise of due diligence, is unable to 
know of "the existence of an injury and its cause." Hargett, 598 
F. Supp. at 155; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436; Foil, 601 P.2d at 
148. In this case the discovery rule should toll the limitations 
period because, under a proper interpretation of Foil, there was no 
evidence that Jones knew that the surgery was the likely or 
probable cause of his injury until September of 1987. 
3. The Foil Legal Injury Test Requires That A Plaintiff 
Know Or Should Know The Possibility of Negligence. 
The Trial Court found that Jones "knew or should have 
known that he had sustained an injury and the causation of the 
same, on or about May of 1984." PL. at 1046 (Court's Decision). 
The Trial Court erroneously found based on this knowledge, Jones 
"had two years from May of 1984, the point of discovery, in which 
to file an Intent to Commence Legal Action." PL. at 1047 (Court's 
Decision). 
Jones, contrary to Appellees' assertions, has never 
argued a legal determination of negligence or expert medical 
opinion of negligence is necessary to start the statute. Deschamps, 
8 
at 474. On the other hand, a plaintiff must be aware of facts from 
which he reasonably should suspect "a possibility of negligence". 
Haraett, at 155; Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 
694, 696-97 (Utah 1980); Deschamps, at 474; See also Pope v. Gray, 
760 P.2d 763, 764 (Nev. 1988); Massey, 669 P.2d at 249; Cleveland, 
701 P.2d at 1306; Wehrman v. United States, 830 F.2d 1480, 1484 
(8th Cir. 1987). In other words, a plaintiff must be aware of 
facts which reasonably indicate that something may have gone wrong 
in the performance of the medical care; that is, some fact 
indicating malpractice by the health care provider. Foil, 601 P.2d 
at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d at 696; Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 
1987); See also Jones v. Salem Hospital, 762 P.2d 303, 313 (Or. 
App. 1988); Jordan v. United States, 503 F.2d 620, 621, 623-24 (6th 
Cir. 1974); Bridcrford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 
1977); Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983); Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418, 424-25 (10th Cir. 
1977); Hamilton, 773 F.2d at 466. 
However, "[a] surgical procedure is not malpractice 
simply because it does 'not turn out as it was supposed to have. '" 
DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 1979). 
Therefore, even if Jones experienced a dysfunction following 
surgery, this does not ipso facto mean that he had reason to 
believe it may have been caused by malpractice. Discovery of legal 
injury encompasses both knowledge of injury and knowledge of the 
possibility of negligence. Foil, 601 P.2d at 144. 
9 
Appellees and the Trial Court discount and omit any 
reference to the specific requirement that plaintiff have some 
knowledge that the injury was possibly caused by negligence. In 
this case, no evidence was presented by Appellees, nor did the 
Trial Court find that Jones had reason to know the injury he 
sustained was possibly attributable to negligence on the part of 
Appellees. In fact, just the opposite was found by the Trial 
Court. In its factual findings, the Trial Court stated that Jones 
was aware and was told by Dr. Becker that sexual dysfunction was 
one of the foreseeable and possible results of the surgery. PL. at 
1048. This means that Jones was found to be aware that even a 
properly performed surgery may have resulted in dysfunction. There 
was no evidence presented that Jones was ever told or should have 
known that the surgery may have been performed improperly. 
Therefore, Jones' awareness of injury and knowledge that it may 
have been caused by the surgery are not tantamount to knowledge of 
negligence as required by Foil. See Hove, 621 P. 2d at 696-97; 
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154-155; Deschamps, at 474; Brower, 744 
P.2d at 1339; See also Cleveland, 701 P.2d at 1306; Wehrman, 830 
F.2d at 1484; Prenderville v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 867, 868 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jordan, 503 F.2d at 623. 
The only evidence regarding knowledge of the possibility 
of negligence was Jones7 testimony that Dr. Dayton reported to him 
that the "most likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions was that 
"something went wrong during the surgeries". TR. at 1449 lines 18-
25, at 1450 lines 12-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). This 
10 
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At best, 1: .he record shows that J ones knew he was 
s u f f e r i n g f rom i n j u r i e s wh I c h r e s u 11 e d f rom t he s urge ry
 if b ut no t 
caused by an unknown act of negligence by an exper t , the ] aw ought 
not to be construed to destroy a r i ght of action before a person 
at ] 4' 3 The Ti: :i a II Coiii: t improperly appl led Foil and I ts progeny, 
mandating reversa 1 of the judgment for a proper i nquir y regarding 
J o i:i e s ' k n o w ] e d g e :: • f t: h e p o s s i b :i ] i 1: y c f n e g J i g e n c e 
B# T H E TRIAL COURT EKM:,L, .. rt MATTE^ -•*, 
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTINUING TFF ATMENT 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY Jr.- THIS CASJI . 
The Trial Court I:L 1 t:d latter • * f 1 aw t .hat the 
continuing treatment ioctri ne - nut. apt ! : %ab] e si nee 1 .he 
1 egi sJ atuI e passed § ; 8- 1 i• 4, , ^ a me,. i ^ .) ,, 31: L. • at 11 052 
(Court' s Decision) , PI ,, at ] 088 ( Conci us:i oris of Law f 6 ); and ( 2 ) 
that the doctrine would not apply to the facts of this case because 
of Jones' knowledge of his injury and possible causes, and the 
absence of any misleading conduct preventing Jones from obtaining 
medical information as a result of the continuing treatment. PL. 
at 1088 (Conclusions of Law, 57).3 
In cases involving the application of a statute, the 
primary objective is to determine the intent and purpose for which 
it was enacted. Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846, 847 (Utah, 1967). 
Section 78-14-4 was enacted for the purpose of codifying the 
discovery rule adopted in Christiansen. Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 
436-37. The statute was designed to provide greater protection of 
the public in cases of medical malpractice by extending or tolling 
the statute of limitations according to the unigue facts in each 
case. 
Legislative bodies are presumed to legislate with 
knowledge of judicial precedent. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 
580-81 (1978). Where, as here, the legislature adopts a statute of 
limitations against a background of existing law, a court should 
not infer an intent to depart from that precedent absent some clear 
legislative intent. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 874 
F.2d 169, 172-73 (3rd Cir. 1989). Therefore, "failure to make 
changes in a given statute in a particular respect when the subject 
3
 Appellees' erroneously state that Jones did not cite Utah 
authority in support of the continuing treatment doctrine and did 
not argue the physician-patient relationship doctrine at trial. 
Appellees Brief at 43, 45. Both of these issues were raised before 
the trial court and are part of the record upon which the court 
based its decision. TR. at 1723 line 25, at 1724 lines 1-10. 
I s b e f o r e t h e i j e g i s i a t i. ,••• . : :wher. • • Twinges a r e :naae * ^ r 
r e s p e c t s , (:i 1: ) • 
u n c h a n g e d I n t h a ; -..df.t.vj; - a t e i - . M i c h a e i , 41..- r . . .vj -bb 
(Ca ] 1 9 6 6 ) . H e r e , A p p ^ . I e e s and *-\e Tr i a . C ' d r t r •-. -: , r r no 
J e g j sJ a t i v <= • ..... - -: 
L e g i s l a t u r e i t j e i Leu i - e t e i e i , u i e ^.,,jir . i i u iny t r e d t m t n r . i..>cxi * n e 
when a d o p t i n g § / H - . - : • • A p p e l l e e - ; Lnste- id a r a u ^ t h a t ?~R< --;n<* on 
o f t h e c o n t i ni :i :i . . : - , , , • 
the legislature- ,SJJU ,*'U io- -;,;.. '^u; r - :ne ^anu- «-srqu u^m *£-: 
presented tc th- ! * r ; iv-rn*1 ^  -:r- •• -"hristiansei. *hri ot"iansen, 
43 6 P 2 1 i ! 13 ; T'l: C < )i i. t: I i eje M :  1: J ; < I I .hat arg umen t • : I i • .• :) 1 1 i I 
doctrines to J 1 ing statutes of I imitation are judicial In ori gin, to 
wit: " [Tjhis coin: t w:i thoi it benefi t :)f J egi sJ ati ve ed i ct, 
I p exceptions to the limitations 
std! it / ; ; x
 f„r a -r.ic*. action;; namely, where there is a continui ng 
trr ^ T - r - i-*-<~r • ' ! Christiansen, 13 6 31= 2 i 
a ,;,, ,..,.., ,^,;-,^,Aig Peteier J , u y^u v.. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84, 8 ; 88 
(Utah 198.1 ) (Howe, concurring) ; See also Mayer v. Good 
Samaritan Hospita 1 , 482 P , 2d 49 7 , 501 (A r :i z A pp 1 9 71 ) • 
Absent evidence of Li itent to abrogate the precedent of 
Peteier, the enactment ut U IB-1A -4 should be read as bed ng 
consi sten t: If I: .he J e<j i c; I >H mir ^• :iiat !: .he cc n t:::i ni led 
recogn i tioii c: f the continui ng treatuici.i ; .>ctrine is incorr ect, :i t 
Is free to do so, llnl i 1 lh.it 1 irne,, ihis Court should not deny a 
p.1 a i iitj fl" access tn lit ih'" rnurtr. Ny^i , fi Pi I' "ill ill n " illewn, 
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Jr., concurring); Mayer, 482 P.2d at 501-02; Yoshizaki v. Hilo 
Hospital, 433 P.2d 220, 224 (Hawaii 1967). 
1. The Discovery Rule And The Continuing Treatment Doctrine Are 
Consistent. 
Courts considering the issue, have held that under the 
discovery rule, statutes of limitation properly run from the end of 
a period of continuous medical treatment. Metzger v. Kalke, 709 
P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985)(and cases cited therein). In states 
where the legislature has incorporated the discovery rule into a 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice, their Supreme 
Courts recognize the continuing treatment doctrine as an exception 
to the limitations period.6 Federal courts interpreting the 
6
 See e.g. , (1) California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §340.5; 
Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131, 135 (Cal. 1958); 
Myers v. Stevenson, 270 P.2d 885, 886-87 (Cal. 1954); (2) Missouri, 
V.A.M.S. Civ. Proc. & Limit. §516.105; Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 
S.W.2d 760, 762 (1943); Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Mo. 
App. 1980); Green v. Washington University Medical Center, 761 
S.W.2d 688, 689-90 (Mo. App. 1988); (3) Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. 
Comm. & Limit, of Actions §25-222 (Reissue 1989); Williams v. 
Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Neb. 1941); Smith v. Dewey, 335 N.W.2d 
530, 533 (Neb. 1983); and (4) Wyoming, W.S. Limit, of Actions §1-3-
107(a); Metzger, 709 P.2d at 414; Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 
669 (Wyo. 1988). 
Appellees cite Bixler v. Bowman, 614 P.2d 1290 (Wash. 1980) 
for the proposition that the continuing treatment doctrine is 
inconsistent with the discovery rule. The continuing treatment 
rule in Washington was "affected only slightly" in Bixler, which 
holds only that the doctor-patient relationship ends with the 
patients' last visit with the doctor. The rule that the statute is 
tolled during a continuing course of treatment endures. Note, 
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations in Washington, 57 Wash. 
L. Rev. 317, 329 (1982). 
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barred "unless it .is presented to trie appropriate FederaJ agency 
within two years af ter such claim accrues." 28 U.S.C. §2401(b). 
Federal courts follow rhe discovery rule to determine when a claim 
accrues under * ::• fTCA Perkins v. United Sta tes , 76 F.R.D. 591, 
8S'ee, e . g . . Page v. United States , 729 F.2d 818, 823n. 36 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 
F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Accardi v. United States , 356 
I5 Supp. 218 , 221 ( S . D. N. Y. 1973 ); Kossick v. United States , 330 
F.2d 933, 936 (2d Cir. 1 964); Kelly v. United Sta tes , 554 F, Supp. 
1001, 1003-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Miller v. United States , 458 F. 
Supp 363, 365-66 (D. Puerto Rico 1978); Otto v. National I n s t i t u t e 
of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1987); and Wehrman v. 
United S ta tes , 830 F 2d ] 480 1 i83 ( 8 1 h Ci r 1 987) 
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250; Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the 
Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 
Albany L. Rev. 64, 68-69 (1984) (hereinafter "Comment"); Metz r, 
709 P.2d at 417; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988. Contrary to the ^ lal 
Court's conclusion, the doctrine applies to patients who hav full 
knowledge of the physician's negligent acts. Kelly v. United 
States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y 1983); Wehrman, 830 F.2d 
at 1483; LaBay v. White Plains Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 
(1983) ("The fact that [plaintiff] *may have been aware of the 
alleged tort and its results on the day of the fall did not deprive 
[plaintiff] of the tolling protection of the continuous treatment 
doctrine.") 
The rationale for the continuous treatment doctrine rests 
on a number of sound policy factors not completely addressed by 
§78-14-4. First, equity dictates that a remedy be available where 
the negligent acts of the health care provider caused the 
lengthened treatment. Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 
779 (N.Y. 1962); Comment at p. 68-69. Additionally, a patient has 
the right to place trust and confidence in his physician during the 
period of treatment. Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Williams, 1 N.W.2d 
at 124; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988; Mortensen v. United States, 509 F. 
Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Comment, at p. 69-70. The physician 
also has superior medical knowledge; therefore, the patient may 
rely on his physician's expertise and training and accepts in good 
16 
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course, the statute of limitations begins to run when the tre' ment 
terminates. Williams, 1 N.W.2d at 124; Metzger, 709 P.2d a 417. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for co nued 
recognition of the doctrine in this case is that it gi 3 the 
patient the right to rely upon the doctor's professior ^ skill 
without the necessity of interrupting a continuing course of 
treatment by instituting suit. Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Borgia, 
187 N.E.2d at 779; Holdridqe, 440 F. Supp. at 1098; Perkins, 76 
F.R.D. at 592; Kelly, 554 F. Supp. at 1004; Grubbs v. Rawls, 369 
S.E.2d 683, 686 (Va. 1988). This allows the patient the 
opportunity to seek corrective treatment as well as giving the 
physician a reasonable chance to identify and correct any errors. 
Williams, 1 N.W.2d at 124; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988; Grubbs, 369 
S.E.2d at 686; Whitmore v. Fabi, 399 N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Mich. App. 
1986) . 
Based on these sound principles, this Court should 
recognize the continuing treatment doctrine as a valuable and 
viable exception to §78-14-4. Further, the evidence in the record 
illustrates the necessity of continued recognition of the doctrine. 
There is abundant testimony that Jones engaged in a lengthy and 
continuing program of care and treatment for his disease by 
Appellees from December, 1983 through January, 1987. TR. at 1557 
lines 18-21, at 1590 line 25, at 1591 line 1 (testimony of Terri 
Stoker); TR. at 1167 lines 23-25, at 1168 lines 1-25, at 1169 
lines 1-10 (testimony of Dr. Dayton); TR. at 1410 lines 2-7, at 
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8-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1256 lines 17-23 (testimony 
of Dr. Becker). In fact, Dr. Becker testified that it would have 
been unreasonable for Jones to seek post-surgical follow up care 
somewhere else. TR. at 1259 lines 23-25, at 1260 lines 1-19 
(testimony of Dr. Becker). 
Based on these facts, even assuming Jones knew of the 
possibility of negligence in 1984, he had virtually no alternative 
but to continue treatment and care with Appellees until the 
treatment was concluded in 1987. According to Appellees' 
interpretation of the statute, the limitations period in this case 
would have run over a year before Jones stopped seeing Dr. Becker. 
Under such circumstances, "[i]t would be absurd to require a 
wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving a 
summons on the physician. . . . " Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 779. See 
also Otto, 815 F.2d at 988-89. Obvious injustice would result from 
requiring Jones to disrupt his exclusive and complex medical 
treatment that would, and in fact did result from initiating suit. 
TR. 1451 lines 22-25, at 1452 lines 1-19 (testimony of G. Kevin 
Jones). 
According to the stipulated facts, Dr. Becker's last act 
as Jones' physician occurred in January, 1987. Accordingly, Jones 
had until January, 1989, to file his action. It is undisputed that 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action was filed on December 4, 1987, 
well within the statutory period. 
20 
The changing field of medical practice in the United 
States requires recognition of the continuing treatment doctrine. 
The application of the discovery rule without the continuing 
treatment exception is unrealistic and inconsistent with modern 
medicine.4 Jones' complex course of treatment is an example of 
the many patients who are dependent upon one "sub-specialist" for 
their entire course of treatment. It would be absurd to require a 
patient to sue that physician before that specialized, necessary 
treatment had ended. Such a requirement would ironically preserve 
the cause of action but, at the same instant, would foreclose the 
patient's only available means of medical recovery. Accordingly, 
this Court should uphold the continuing treatment doctrine as a 
consistent exception to §78-14-4. See, e.g., Brigance v. Velvet 
Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Okl. 1986); Ontiveros 
v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 208-09 (Ariz. 1983). 
C. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT EXCEPTION 
TO THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD. 
In Myers the Utah Supreme Court recognized that in 
"exceptional circumstances or causes of action" the statute of 
limitations should be tolled where its application would be 
"irrational or unjust." Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. When injustice 
A recent report by The Journal of the American Medical 
Association concludes that "The environment of medical practice is 
changing more rapidly than ever before. Growth of medical 
knowledge and changes in the way medicine is practiced are 
producing an explosion of new sub-specialties. . . . " The Journal 
of the American Medical Association, Vol. 268, No. 9 (Sept. 2, 
1992) at p. 1105. 
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would occur, courts may properly fashion an equitable exception to 
the statutory period. Klamm Shell v. Berg, 441 P.2d 10, 13 (Colo. 
1968); Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Myers, 635 P.2d at 87-88; 
Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436-37; Foil, 601 P.2d at 147-48; Burnett 
v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)(The 
policy underlying the statute of limitations may be outweighed 
"where the interests of justice require vindication of the 
plaintiff's rights."). It is the basic and fundamental duty of 
this Court "to aid the furtherance of justice and (ensure) that 
every litigant shall be permitted to enjoy his day in court." 
Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co., 400 P.2d 892, 894 (Mont. 1965); 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 88 (Howe, Jr., concurring). 
To determine whether equity should toll the limitations 
period, the Court in Myers utilized a balancing test stating, 
"[t]he hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the 
plaintiff [was to be balanced against] any prejudice to the 
defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of 
time." Myers, 635 P. 2d at 87. The Court in Myers found 
"exceptional circumstances" to be present where the guardians did 
not discover the wrongful death of their ward until after the 
statute of limitations had run. The Court also noted that the 
problems of proof caused by the delay were not significantly 
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different for the defendant than for the plaintiffs. Myers, 635 
P.2d at 87.5 
In this case, the policy against stale claims is 
outweighed by the unique circumstances of Jones' hardship and 
medical condition. Appellees cannot establish that they would be 
prejudiced by having to defend Jones' claim since their problems of 
proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than Jones'. Cf. 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. 
In contrast, Jones would be irreparably prejudiced if he 
were expected to file an action while still undergoing continued 
medical treatment from the only physician in the intermountain area 
trained to treat him. Equity demands Jones be allowed to bring his 
action after treatment by Dr. Becker concluded. 
After applying the balancing test, Jones would be left 
without a legal remedy after completion of his course of treatment. 
If Jones is "denied the opportunity of proceeding with [his] 
action, the law would be in the untenable position of having 
created a remedy for [Jones] and then barring [him] from exercising 
it before [he] had any practical opportunity to do so." Myers, 635 
P.2d at 87. See also Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 
5The governing policy in the area of the statute of 
limitations, as declared by the Utah Supreme Court, "is that 
statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 
quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
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694 P.2d 143, 147 (Alaska 1984) (citing Myers); Foil, 601 P.2d at 
147. Even assuming Jones knew of a legal injury, equity should 
permit the statutory period to be tolled until conclusion of 
treatment by Dr. Becker. Jones' actions should not be barrec oy 
the technical application of §78-14-4 when such obvious injustice 
would result. 
CONCLUSION 
Jones has shown that even assuming the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact are grounded in evidence, there was no evidence 
offered that Jones knew or had reason to know of the possibility of 
negligence prior to September of 1987. The Trial Court failed to 
properly apply the requirements of knowledge of "legal injury" as 
required by Foil and its progeny, mandating reversal of the 
judgment. 
This Court should also continue recognition of Peteler 
and the continuing treatment doctrine as an exception to the 
statute. Under the unique facts of this case, rigid application of 
the statute of limitations in this case would unreasonably require 
Jones to choose between continued, life-saving medical treatment 
and his legal remedy. The continuing treatment doctrine offers an 
equitable solution to the conflict by permitting essential medical 
treatment to continue and by preserving legal rights. 
Finally, compelling circumstances exist to warrant an 
exception to the inflexible interpretation of §78-14-4 proposed by 
Appellees. There is no greater prejudice to Appellees than to 
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Jones in permitting equitable tolling of the statute pending 
completion of medical treatment by Dr. Becker. This Court may 
properly vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the Trial 
Court for retrial of the merits of this case under Foil and 
Peteler. 
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